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'It is possible; according to Camus, 'to separate the literature of consent,
which coincides, by and large, with ancient history and the classical
period from the literature of rebellion which begins in modern times: I
That 'possibility' has subsequently been eagerly entertained, as even
a casual reading of both the critical reflections upon and the self-
perceptions of literary modernity would quickly confirm. And perhaps
there, in that eagerness, there is matter for further reflection.
let us allow at the outset that, at the level of cultural intentionality,
there is an initial case to be made for Camus's historical and literary
division: that is, to assign the activity and effect of rebellion to the
writing practice of an epoch is to insist upon a certain wilfulness in
that practice - a wilfulness that easily accommodates itself to the
cultural struggle to be modern. For 'modernity' is volitional, not
circumstantial: from the late fifth century onwards, according to
Habermas, and with varying contents,
the term "modern" again and again expresses the consciousness of an epoch
that relates itself to the past of antiquit~ in order to view itself as the result
of a transition from the old to the new.
That modernity is itself the effect of a wilful cultural effort should
not be in question - doubtless in time, and in the midst of its self-
recognitions, each period participates more or less in its own volitional
novelty. The question here is rather how the content of this modernity
came to be defined not only by its rebellious character but also by
the character of its rebelliousness. Because that is Camus's point:
disdaining 'consent: rebellious modernity (or literary modernity in any
case) is figured as irreducible to the moment of its impulsive reaction
against the past and has come to be distinguished instead both by the
perceived violence of its break with the Classical tradition and by the
apparent discovery of an oppositional insistence within its own textual
being. Thus for Barthes:
The social intervention of a text (not necessarily achieved at the time the text
appears) is measured not by the popularity of its audience or by the fidelity of
the socio-economic reflection it contains or projects to a few eager sociologists,
but rather by the violence that enables it to exceed the laws that a society, an
ideology, a philosophy establish for themselves in a fine surge of historical
intelligibility. This excess is called: writing.3
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So the text confirms itself as essentially rebeIlious when it is most
faithful to its own being - 'writing' - and it thereby also confirms
its role within the intentionality of modernity: for read in this way
the text becomes implicated in, and finds its meaning in, the
apprehension of a generalized movement of rebellion when modernity
finds its political orientation on the side of the Other - on the side
of the improper, the immoral, the illicit, the scandalous, the excessive
- and when text and modernity are therefore grasped together as the
effects of an essential transgression.
This valorization of the transgressive in contemporary reflection is,
by and large, an unremarkable event, for transgression can be seen
as providing a rationale not only for the literature but also for much
of the literary culture of the post-Classical period. There is, for example,
the tangled sequence that commences with Poe: by a fortuitous
conjunction the work of this Gothic visionary, dipsomaniac and sexual
monster (or so he was to be represented after the marriage with his
thirteen year-old cousin) is translated into French by a dissolute
revolutionary - Charles Baudelaire. Compounding this relation the
reclusive FIaubert is called to answer charges of obscenity for the
publication of Madame Bovary before the same court, for the same
charge, and in the same year (1856), as Baudelaire for his Les Fleurs
du Mal. The novel of adultery is allowed, six of the poems are
suppressed, but more importantly the irresistible thematics of modern
writing culture are indelibly drawn in and from this constellation of
events: rebeIlion, sexual deviance, obsession, a kind of mystical
seclusion from the world and a concomitant devotion to the task of
writing, and (most significant of all in this context) defiant
confrontation with a prohibitive law. The same scenario is to be played
out again and again as the trials proliferate through the years -
Ulysses, Lady Chatterley's Lover, Tropic ofCancer - and of course
all of these have their own interest as discrete events, but it is their
cumulative historico-cultural effect that is truly crucial. For in the
successive persistence of these identical dramas, transgression begins
to acquire its emphatic modern value - in the words of Henry Miller:
'Whenever a taboo is broken, something good happens, something
vitalizing.4 Freed from the stigma of mere wrongdoing, the event of
transgression (increasingly understood as a fracturing of the code:
societal, moral, ideological, formal) comes to be read not as the effect
of but as the initiating moment of modernity and as that which
imposes an effective historical trajectory upon it, directing it towards
liberation in successive convulsions that outstrip and overcome an
anterior order of prohibition and repression.
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No doubt it is the current postmodern sense of our own transgressive
novelty that accounts for our re-discovery in recent years of the Gothic:
that fascinating group of texts that appear to record the dreamscape
of Otherness in all of its illicit perversity; texts that appear to enact
the violent contest of repression and liberation; and, crucially, texts
that arrive simultaneously with the sense of European modernity itself.
From the very first it was possible to discover in them a rebellious
and liberating movement within textuality: 'This genre; Sade was to
claim at the time,
was the inevitable product of the revolutionary shocks with which the whole
of Europe resounded. For those who were acquainted with all the ills that are
brought upon men by the wicked, the romantic novel was becoming somewhat
difficult to write, and merely monotonous to read: there was nobody left who
had not experienced more misfortunes in four or five years than could be depicted
in a century by literature's most famous novelists: it was necessary to call upon
hell for aid in order to arouse interest, and to find in the land of fantasies what
was common knowledge from historical observation of man in this iron age.5
The 'hell' and the 'land of fantasies' invoked here find their correlatives
in contemporary analysis in that more recent but intimately related
lexicon of Otherness which - as is already implied in Sade - rehearses
the distinctively modern narrative of repression, rebellion,
transgression, and liberation. It is most succinctly put by William
Patrick Day in his In The Circles of Fear and Desire:
The realistic novel had given the new, urban, middle class readers a definition
of reality, of their outer, social lives, and their public fables of identity. The Gothic
fantasy provided this same group with internal definitions of the reality they
felt and experienced, definitions that might not fit with public fables. It helped
shape its readers' sense of their own subjectivity. In this way the Gothic is part
of that process by which we move from thinking of our inner life in terms of
souls to thinking of it in terms of psyches.6
It is this tracing of the shift from soul to psyche that accounts for
the character of the critical attention that the Gothic has come to
receive. From the very first this genre had presented itself to the
reflective eye as an object of cryptic fascination - a body of work
not to be attended to (as in the didactic novel of eighteenth century
manners) nor to be 'experienced' (as in the emergent realist novel) but
rather to be deciphered. For, on reflection, the destiny of the Gothic
text was to be puzzling; and when the practice of writing shifts from
the symbolic to the cryptographic, when the text is detached from the
order of the novelistic and given over to the order of the sign, then
critical practice must work at bringing to light the 'unspoken' of the
text, that inarticulate immanence embedded within the signal delirium
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of the Gothic story. Whence a certain allegorization of the Gothic
text - a mode of analysis which, in recent critical reflection, has had
the effect of confirming the Gothic within the modern dynamic of
transgression, whereby the text is both recruited to and provides
evidence for the reading of literary modernity as the trace of the
transgressive Other.
Not surprisingly the text that has attracted the greatest amount of
critical attention is The New Prometheus or, as it is less rebelliously
titled, Frankenstein. For here would be found the essential themes
and imagery out of which the sense of the new was made: there is
the figure of the obsessive and solitary artificer, the emphasis upon
a perverse or distorted sexuality, the union of artistic creation with
metaphysical rebellion, the oneiric quality of both the tale and the
circumstances of the telling (oneiric or fantastic or both, as the text
seems to insist upon by likening the narrative situation more than once
to the nightmarish encounter of the wedding guest with the Ancient
Mariner). In fact a brief survey of some of the more intriguing of the
recent interpretations of Frankenstein reveals it to be an exemplary
modern text - at least in the sense in which I am using that term,
'modern: here.
In Signs Taken for UVnders Franco Monetti has argued that 'The
literature of terror is born precisely out of the terror of a split society'
- that is, modern industrial society split between the competing realms
of worker and capital - and 'out of the desire to heal' that split. This
'split' Monetti reads as figured in the characters of and relationship
between Frankenstein and the creature:
Like the proletariat, the monster is denied a name and an individuality. He is
the Frankenstein monster; he belongs wholly to his creator Gust as one can speak
of a 'Ford worker'). Like the proletariat, he is a collective and artificial creature.
He is not found in nature, but built. Frankenstein is a productive inventor-scientist
... Reunited and brought back to life in the monster are the limbs of those
- the 'poor' - whom the breakdown of feudal relations has forced into
brigandage, poverty and death. Only modern science - this metaphor for 'the
dark Satanic mills' - can offer them a future. 7
In narrativizing the essential conflicts of industrial society, Monetti
argues, the Gothic tends at once to give expression to the traumas
of social existence under capitalism while it exorcizes those traumas
via the mechanisms of narrative figuration and closure (which serve
to resolve those conflicts at an aesthetic level). 'Illiberal in a deep sense;
he concludes, the Gothic 'mirrors and promotes the desire for an
integrated society, a capitalism that manages to be 'organic~8 The
Gothic is thus marked simultaneously by the return of the repressed
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(via the metaphoricity of character and action) and by the sublimation
of repressed desire (via the overcoming of terror through narrative
closure): it therefore enacts the dynamic of psycho-social trauma and
ideological recuperation.
Other readers have been less inclined to stress the 'illiberal' character
of the literature of terror than Monetti - especially in the case of
Frankenstein - and thus have come to direct critical attention more
forcefully towards its narrative capacity to provide release for repressed
material of a psycho-social, socio-sexual, and even psycho-biographical
kind. Thus Ellen Moers, writing in the mid 1970s, put forward a
powerful claim for the subversive aspects of the text in terms of Mary
Shelley's own psychic investment in its radical figurative distortions.
Noting that happy maternal reactions are 'deeply rooted in our cultural
mythology, and certainly in our literature; Moers places critical
emphasis upon Frankenstein's abandonment of the creature at the
moment it receives the spark of life. 'Here; she claims,
is where Mary Shelley's book is most interesting, most powerful, and most
feminine: in the motif of revulsion against newborn life, and the drama of guilt,
dread, and flight surrounding its consequences. Most of the novel, roughly two
of its three volumes, can be said to deal with the retribution visited upon monster
and creator for deficient infant care. Frankenstein seems to be dinstinctly a
woman's mythmaking on the subject of birth precisely because its emphasis is
not upon what precedes birth, not upon birth itself, but upon what follows birth:
the trauma of the afterbirth.9
Quite apart from the manifest differences in interpretation Moers's
reading of Frankenstein departs dramatically from Monetti's in
assigning a subversive edge to the text which is not blunted by its being
recuperated - by whatever textual or interpretative strategy - back
into the normative emphases of early nineteenth-century- socio-sexual
discourse. It is true that this second reading allows the text a certain
therapeutic value, but that value exists exclusively for the writing
subject, exclusively for Mary Shelley who, it is implied, benefits
psychologically from this process of literary construction and the
psychic exorcism it performs for her: significantly this is a personalized
value that does not translate to the wider socio-cultural environment.
In this sense Moers's is an avowedly 'rebellious' reading of the Gothic
in general and of Frankenstein in particular in so far as it conceives
of the Gothic text as providing liberating expression both for the
tortured psyche of Mary ShelleylO and for the socially scandalous
questioning of maternity which, it is implied, conceals beneath a
complex of associated cultural values - social increase, familial
harmony, the ordered transfer of property, and so on - the suppressed
110
SYDNEY STUDIES
actuality of female suffering in the dual traumas of childbirth and
infant mortality.
In their more detailed reading of Frankenstein, Sandra Gilbert and
Susan Gubar, taking their cue from Moers's response, tie the question
of the constrained place of women in late Georgian society to the
question of the constrained place of the woman writer in English
patriarchial literary culture, and in particular to the woman writer's
relationship to the presiding 'male culture myth': Paradise Lost. II The
'agony of female sexuality' specified by Moers is thus given a socio-
literary aetiology in Gilbert and Gubar's analysis:
Mary Shelley would have absorbed a keen sense of the agony of female sexuality,
and specifically of the perils of motherhood, not just from ftIradise Lost and
from her own mother's fearfully exemplary fate but also from Wollstonecraft's
almost prophetically anxious writings. 12
Gilbert and Gubar are thus enabled to both enlarge and focus the
subversive reference of the text, at the same time assigning it an
historico-cultural specificity, crystallized in a kind of literary squaring-
off between Mary Shelley and John Milton. 'For it becomes
increasingly clear as one reads Frankenstein with Paradise Lost in
mind; according to this reading, that
Frankenstein is ultimately a mock ftIradise Lost in which both Victor and his
monster, together with a number of secondary characters, play all the neo-biblical
parts over and over again - all except, it seems at first, the part of Eve. Not
just the striking omission of any obvious Eve-figure from this "Woman's book"
about Milton, but also the barely concealed sexual components of the story as
well as our earlier analysis of Milton's bogeyl3 should tell us, however, that for
Mary Shelley the part of Eve is all the parts. l4
The 'agony of female sexuality' broadens from the particularized
trauma of the afterbirth to that of an essentially tortured existence
played out in the anguished lives of every character in this text.
Moreover, as parodic re-writing of the most potent myth of patriarchal
literary culture, the text illuminates the complicity of the putatively
'disinterested' poetic word in the maintenance of the constricting and
- for the woman writing - fundamentally hostile socio-cultural
environment. The situation of the woman writing, in this instance,
becomes analogous to that of the typical Gothic heroine - Emily
in The Mysteries of Udolpho, Immalee in Melmoth the Wanderer,
Agnes in The Monk - an analogy signalled here by the significant
absence of that heroine, confined within the male domain and subject
to its pleasure. Far from being therapeutic, then, the practice of writing
in this instance enacts instead the monologue of terrorized delirium:
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'Most obviously; Gilbert and Gubar contend of their own reading,
'the dreamlike shifting of fantasy figures from part to part, costume
to costume, tells us that we are in fact dealing with the psychodrama
or waking dream that Shelley herself suspected she had written.'15
Finally it is worth drawing attention to Gayatri Spivak's essay Three
Women's Texts and a Critique of Imperialism~which - in addition
to the socio-political and politico-sexual analyses already considered
- reads Frankenstein as an interrogative irruption within the self-
conceptions of early nineteenth-century imperialism. Focussing upon
the theme of production, Spivak argues that the text problematizes
the relationship between the formally distinct functions of sexual
reproduction (the feminine familial function) and the production of
the social subject (the male imperialist function), and it does this by
conflating the two in the figure and activity of Victor Frankenstein,
whose laboratory thereby becomes 'an artificial womb where both
projects are undertaken simultaneously.'16 In this reading, then, the
text challenges the normative discourses of empire and the family
through their distorted resiting in, and confusion within, the singular
character of Victor, who thus can be read as dramatizing the
problematics of the missionary imposition. The crucial moment in 'this
overtly didactic text~17 as Spivak sees it, is that point at which
Frankenstein aborts the intended bride of the creature - an admission
of confused paralysis at both the sexual and the social levels of
production. 'In the final judgement of classical psychoanalysis; Spivak
argues,
the phallic mother exists only by virtue of the castration anxious son; in
Frankensetin:s judgement. the hysteric father (Victor Frankenstein gifted with
his laboratory - the womb of theoretical reason) cannot produce a daughter.
Here the language of racism - the dark side of imperialism understood as social
mission - combines with the hysteria of masculism into the idiom of (the
withdrawal of) sexual reproduction rather than subject-consitituion. The roles
of masculine and feminine individualists are hence reversed and displaced. IX
The argument here, then, is that Victor's failure to create again in his
own image (a failure at the level of sexual reproduction) gives rise to
an atavistic fear of the alien and a paralysis of missionary nerve (a
failure at the level of imperialist subject-constitution):
Frankenstein cannot produce a "daughter" because "she might become ten
thousand times more malignant than her mate ... [and becausej one of the
first results of those sympathies for which the demon thirsted would be children.
and a race of devils would be propagated upon the earth who might make the
very existence of the species of man a condition precarious and full of terror."
This particular narrative strand also launches a thoroughgoing critique of the
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eighteenth centur~ European discourses on the origin of society through (Western
Christian) man. I
And here with Spivak's reading, in which the transgressive energy of
Mary Shelley's text is raised to its highest pitch, it is perhaps time to
pause and reflect upon these contemporary reflections upon the
Gothic. In sketching these responses here I did not wish to reproduce
a series of analyses (analyses whose intentionally provocative character
and whose penetration I could not have reproduced here in any case)
- I wished rather to indicate the figurative content of recent analysis
as it pertains to the Gothic text. Because I would suggest that that
content, and therefore the mode of analysis it sustains, has been
determined in part by the wilfulness of modernity itself - or indeed
(to press the point) is a part of the self-representation of a volitional
modernity and therefore is participant in the realization of that
'possibility' Camus identifies as potentially definitive of the literature
of post-Classicism. This is evidenced not only in the figurative content
of critical reflection but also in the movement imposed upon analysis
(from Monetti, and the politicized but 'illiberal' text, to Spivak, and
the text as launching 'a thoroughgoing critique of eighteenth century
European discourses on the origin of society') - a movement
distinguished by a kind of ratchet-like upping of the ante on the
subversive potency of the genre. In this way the Gothic text is recruited
to and finds its place within an historical narrative, epic in scope and
(aptly enough) Promethean in character: it becomes the occasion for,
and under analytic pressure it occasions, a liberating return of the
repressed, a scandalous staging of the Other - scrambled, distorted,
displaced, to be sure (such is the very business of the psychotic text),
but evoked nevertheless in the disfiguring mechanisms of the text and,
what is more, destined to be deciphered.
(I hasten to add that no such grandiose claims are made by any
of the writers to whom I have referred in this essay; moreover each
of those writers would, I suspect, reject this characterization as
inexcusably vulgar. I accept the charge of vulgarity, but would still
want to claim a substantial accuracy for the characterization I have
given both of recent analytical dealings with Gothic texts and of the
historical emphases these dealings disclose: that is, my reflections are
gratuitous only in their vulgarity.)
The point to emphasize here - although it scarcely requires
emphasis at this stage - is that in the case of the Gothic contemporary
critical reflection has had the effect of reducing the novelistic to the
symptomatic. That is the reason for the essential identity of analytic
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mode among the widely divergent interpretative responses cited here
(and it is the reason for my vulgarity above, which is intended to answer
in part to the critical vulgarization of the text). At the same time 1
would be keen to allow that the Gothic occasions this reductive and
vulgar analytic mode, that it is ultimately complicit in its critical
reception as cryptogram (whether individualized as psychobiography
or generalized as cultural irruption). Gothic texts - the more extreme
examples of them, in any case, such as the text at hand - are precisely
those in which the subjects and events of the narrative cannot occur
according to a normative code of social possibility, and yet they are
also those texts in which an exorbitant apparatus of the real is employed
in order to insist upon the actuality of the literally incredible (whence
the emphatic presence of letters and other documents from the frozen
Pole in Frankenstein or from reclusive scribes in Melmoth the
Uilnderer; whence also the convoluted confessional forms of The
Monk; Melmoth the Wanderer and, again, Frankenstein). It is this
conflict of textual interests - realist and fantasist - that necessitates
a speculative response that cannot terminate at the nominated real
and yet is impressed to gesture towards it. And this critical indecision
is correlated precisely with a functional indecision in the text which
appears, in Frankenstein, from the very first word of the unsigned
'Preface' as a musing upon the plausibility or implausibility of the tale
the text is about to tell: 'The event on which this fiction is founded
has been supposed, by Dr Darwin and some of the physiological writers
of Germany, as not of impossible occurrence: 20 That double negative
is the opening gambit of a fundamentally ludic text which will here
explicitly claim that in its simultaneous positing and withholding of
the real, in its calculated mimetic hesitation, the space of the Other
is opened, and a realer real flashes into existence. 'I shall not; the
'Preface' continues,
be supposed as according the remotest degree of serious faith to such an
imagination; yet, in assuming it as the basis of a work of fancy, I have not
considered myself as entirely weaving a series of supernatural terrors. The event
on which the interest of the story depends is exempt from the disadvantages
of a mere tale of spectres or enchantment. It was recommended by the novelty
of the situations which it develops, and however impossible as a physical fact,
affords a point of view to the imagination for the delineating of human passions
more comprehensive and commanding than any which the ordinary relations
of existing events can yield.
So in a prefatory moment this text understands itself as gesturing
towards - without ever arriving with any degree of certainty at ('not
impossible') - a repressed but compelling Otherness; and this gesture,
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embodied in a mimetic hesitation that is distinctly Gothic (or so I
would argue), is always liable to confirm the deepest suspicions of its
respondents which indeed is, I suspect, what Frankenstein has done
for the respondents cited here.
That the Gothic represented a radical interrogation of normative
eighteenth and early nineteenth-century reality is not in question -
there is at least general agreement on this point from those writers
referred to earlier, and in any case it is clear both from the Frankenstein
'Preface' and from Sade's contemporary view that this was a more or
less explicit principle supervising the Gothic enterprise. Less noticed,
however, or at least of less apparent analytic interest, is the consequence
of this interrogation, which amounted to a questioning of the processes
of signification by which that reality was indicated and, in effect,
instituted as empirical fact. That is why the Gothic became the place
of dynamic textual experimentation, and why formally the Gothic text
is marked by a set of narrative procedures which bear either a parodic
or an interrogative relation to the typical procedures of the realist text.
Indeed, the Gothic tends to employ the techniques of realism only
in order to bring them into ironic collision with the intractable materials
of fantasy - as in the elaborate documentation of Frankenstein
already referred to, which serves to sustain throughout the text that
dialectic of plausibility-implausibility with which it commences.
Similarly one finds in the genre as a whole a proclivity for excessively
artificial narrative structures, a tendency towards a doubling of or
blurring of character, a general reliance upon first-person narration,
often embedded within other first-person narrations - all observable
aspects of Frankenstein, and all throwing doubt upon the validity of
those novelistic features that most surely work towards securing the
incontestable nature of the reality the text purports to represent
(features such as the linear development of narrative, the organic
conception of plot and character, and the disinterested objectivity of
omniscient narration). The inherent danger of such a development
is that, in exposing the real as fiction - as the Gothic parodically
and subversively exposes eighteenth-century reality and, in particular,
its novelistic representations - one may not be able to secure it again
as fact. The logic of such a process leads inevitably to the brink of
meaninglessness, to a point where meaning abruptly reverses itself in
a kind of tailspin of insignificance. And this, I suspect, is what occurs
in Frankenstein, and indeed defines quite precisely what I have called
that text's mimetic hesitation, the crucial textual action and the central
informing principle of a story which, after all, is about the terrors of
artifice.
115
SYDNEY STUDIES
'And do I dare to ask you to undertake my pilgrimage; an anguished
Victor Frankenstein rhetorically questions Walton at the conclusion
of his story:
to endure the hardships that I have undergone? No; I am not so selfish. Yet,
when I am dead, if he should appear, if the ministers of vengeance should conduct
him to you, swear that he shall not live - swear that he shall not triumph over
my accumulated woes and survive to add to the list of his dark crimes. He is
eloquent and persuasive, and once his words had even power over my heart;
but trust him not. (p.482)
It is entirely typical of Victor to claim unselfishness and verbal naivety
at the moment his own rhetoric is torturing an unpalatable negative
into a desirable positive, as he begins by refusing to implicate Walton
in his own obsession and concludes by demanding that he swear to
it. Hence the added stress one must give that final irony, when Victor
admits his fear of the rhetorical power of the creature. We at least
can attest to the creature's oratorical power, since even Victor could
not suppress this (indeed, he seemed suspiciously almost to highlight
it) in his report of the creature's tale which does not fail to elicit the
reader's sympathy. But Victor's fear is real enough in this context
because it is the fear of artifice - the fear that words will be taken
for realities. His concern, of course, is that his words only should
function in this way, as is made perfectly clear only ten pages earlier
when he betrays a momentary pride in his own rhetorical power while
relating the entire story yet again, this time to a magistrate:
The magistrate listened to me with attention and kindness. 'Be assured, sir;
said he, 'no pains or exertions on my part shall be spared to discover the villain.'
'I thank you; replied I; 'listen, therefore, to the deposition that I have to make.
It is indeed a tale so strange that 1 should fear you would not credit it were
there not something in truth which, however wonderful, forces conviction. The
story is too connected to be mistaken for a dream, and 1 have no motive for
falsehood.' My manner as I thus addressed him was impressive but calm; 1 had
formed in my own heart a resolution to pursue my destroyer to death, and this
purpose quieted my agony and for an interval reconciled me to life. I now related
my history briefly but with firmness and precision. marking the dates with
accuracy and never deviating into invective or exclamation. (p.471)
That Victor had rehearsed his story and that even in rehearsal he had
related it with an acute self-consciousness of its effects upon an
audience are points which strike neither Victor nor Walton as
important. Consequently in a stunning finale of self-congratulation
and (appropriately) misconception, Victor falls victim to his own
rhetoric when, in an ironic episode unmatched in this text, he reads
a transcript of his own story, thus situating himself in the position
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of Walton, Mrs Saville and, of course, ourselves, and thereby apparently
orchestrating our collective response: 'During these last days I have
been occupied in examining my past conduct; nor do I find it
blameable; he tells Walton (p.490). And then, referring to their earlier
conversation, he observes:
The task of [the creature's] destruction was mine, but I have failed. When actuated
by selfish and vicious motives, I asked you to undertake my unfinished work,
and I renew this request now, when I am only induced by reason and virtue.
(p.490)
But by this stage Victor's motives must surely be subject to suspicion,
especially when he draws explicit attention to their purity.
Not that Victor is a deceitful character - far from it. It is simply
that he has become absorbed by the fictional propensities of language,
caught up in its play of truth and duplicity, plausibility and
implausibility, as he was destined to as soon as he began to confess
his own Gothic story. For more than any other it was the first-person
narrative mode - this cotifessional narrative mode - that attracted
the subversive attentions of the writers of the Gothic (just as it had
attracted the ironic attentions of writers like Swift and Sterne
throughout the preceding century). One of the crucial emphases within
Gothic writing is that any first-person narration is always fatally
compromised - partly because of the apodeictic character of this
mode, as it appears to secure with the greatest degree of certainty the
reality of that world it purports to record; partly because, while
claiming the status of truth, first-person narratives necessarily involve
the accounting of an interested party; but especially - when placed
against the background of the historical development of English Gothic
writing - because the narrative of confession will always be
compromised by its Catholic origins.
As texts like Vathek, The Mysteries of Udolpho and The Monk
make abundantly clear, the Gothic was not only an outlet for a
penetrating inquiry into the self-representations of normative
eighteenth and early nineteenth-century reality, but also for both the
experimental and the xenophobic energies of the contemporary writer.
Hence the tendency to situate the narrative in Catholic Spain, France
and Italy, whereby an atmosphere of duplicity was automatically
evoked for the English reading public - an atmosphere which, in the
development of the confessional narrative mode, was to spill over into
a poetics of duplicity, and entire aesthetics of dissimulation, by the
time of Frankenstein and Melmoth the J#.mderer. Such a poetics was
to give a crucial emphasis both to the ludic character of the text (its
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game with the real) as well as to the corrosive effect of the text (its
subversive questioning of the real). And, as if to confirm this
developmental emphasis within the genre as a whole, confession and
Catholicism emerge simultaneously at two crucial moments in this
text in such a way as to effectively undermine the authority of the
tale as it is told (ambiguity intended).
The second of these two instances occurs in Catholic Ireland, where
Victor is accused of the murder of Clerval because his delirium has
been mistaken for confession - and thus is taken for truth - by the
servants of the jail (that is, in this context, by the oppressed and self-
oppressing subjects of mystificatory Roman authority):
'For that matter; replied the old woman, 'if you mean about the gentleman you
murdered, I believe that it were better for you if you were dead, for I fancy it
will go hard with you! However, that's none of my business; I am sent to nurse
you and get you well; I do my duty with a safe conscience; it were well if
everybody did the same.'
I turned with loathing from the woman who could utter so unfeeling a speech
to a person just saved, on the very edge of death; but I felt languid and unable
to reflect on all that had passed. The whole series of my life appeared to me
as a dream: I sometimes doubted if indeed it were all true, for it never presented
itself to my mind with the force of reality. (pp.448-9)
This association of fantasy with confession is not without its
significance; however the earlier instance is perhaps more telling in
that it makes explicit the relation between confession, Catholicism and
duplicity: it is Justine's confession. 'I did confess; she tells Victor and
Elizabeth.
but I confessed a lie. I confessed that I might obtain absolution; but now that
falsehood lies heavier at my heart than all my other sins. The God of heaven
forgive me! Ever since I was condemned, my confessor has besieged me; he
threatened and menaced, until I almost began to think that I was the monster
that he said I was. He threatened excommunication and hell fire in my last
moments if I continued obdurate. Dear lady. I had none to support me; all looked
on me as a wretch doomed to ignominy and perdition. What could I do? In
an evil hour I subscribed to a lie; and now only am I truly miserable.' (p.350)
By virtue of its critical role in the textual construction of and evocation
of a certain reality, by virtue of its imposing character, its evidentiary
force, but principally by virtue of its background in the perceived
duplicity of Catholic confession, first-person narration was to become
for the Gothic writers a favoured arena for axiological and mimetic
play. And Victor is caught up in this play, which is why his story (when
he reflects upon it, as in those passages quoted earlier) shifts restlessly
between the twin poles of guilt and innocence, confession and
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extenuation, truth and artifice - until he can no longer distinguish
between the two, and neither can we. That is why, in the midst of
this epistemological slippage, there is a general anxiety that some sort
of documentation take place in order to confirm and to certify the
reality conjured by the telling of a tale - whether the creature's to
Victor, or Victor to Walton, or Walton to Mrs Saville, or the text's
to us. But it appears that the written word has no more validity than
the spoken - it too is caught up in the ironic play of uncertainty
that permeates this text, as is clear from Victor's reading of the
transcript of his own story. For at this moment the text dramatizes
yet again the operation of artifice upon the real as Victor apprehends
his life, mediated through the artistry of the word, and immediately
yields to the seductions of the word.
At the heart of his reading Victor discovers three things about
himself: his innocence, his selflessness, and his absolute difference from
the creature - that is he discovers, and takes for realities, the three
fictions that kill Elizabeth (an earlier event which showed the more
brutal operation of artifice upon the real).21 This is what Victor reads:
that in innocence he rejected his creature; that unselfishly he married
Elizabeth; and that the essential difference between himself and the
creature blinded him to the intentions of the latter. Such a reading
is available to him, of course, because Victor too is absorbed here by
the Gothic game of uncertainty, and so he too, as reader, is obliged
to make something of this fantastic story (a story that has not failed
to excite successive generations of readers to try to do the same). And
what strikes Victor is the epical, Manichaean character of the tale:
During these last days I have been occupied in examining my past conduct; nor
do I find it blameable. In a fit of enthusiastic madness I created a rational creature
and was bound towards him to assure, as far as was in my power, his happiness
and well-being. This was my duty; but there was another still paramount to that.
My duties towards the beings of my own species had greater claims to my attention
because they included a greater proportion of happiness or misery. Urged by
this view. I refused, and I did right in refusing, to create a companion for the
first creature. He showed unparallelled malignity and selfishness in evil; he
destroyed my friends; he devoted to destruction beings who possessed exquisite
sensations, happiness, and wisdom; nor do I know where this thirst for vengeance
may end. Miserable himself that he may render no other wretched, he ought
to die. (p.490)
Victor has responded fully to his own rhetoric here (notice, for example,
his noble profession of duty towards the creature, neglecting to mention
his flight from this duty for the first two years of the creature's
existence), and significantly he has exemplified not only the artistry
of narration but also the artistry of interpretation. The point is that
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another reading is available to him, a reading which is in its way equally
fictive (because it is only a part of a story which is never really given
in full) and one which reverses this one point by point. For this second
reading would insist upon the following: first, that the essential identity
between Victor and the creature should have alerted him to the fact
that the creature would duplicate his actions and kill his bride (indeed
Victor is the only reader of this story of whom I am aware who
contrives to register surprise at this event); second, that as a
consequence his marriage to Elizabeth constitutes an act of gross
selfishness; and third, that in his dealings with the creature Victor is
clearly guilty of the crime of rejection.
But then, like everything else in this text, it can be read one way
or the other, because nothing is clearly one thing or the other. Not
only does the narrative extend itself into the implausible, the uncertain,
the suspiciously ambiguous, but the characters also become unstable,
their roles become confused, their functions become tangled. Peripheral
characters are quickly absorbed into this essential instability: Elizabeth,
added to the Frankensteins (a family which ironically grows by a
principle of aggregation rather than regeneration), gets hopelessly
caught up in the confusion of roles and is obliged to become sister,
the mother, then wife to Victor; Walton - divided already between
the megalomaniacal scientific enthusiasm of Victor and his own native
empirical conservatism, literally a halfway house between Continental
masculine excess (as represented by Victor) and British feminine
sobriety (as represented by his sister, Mrs Saville) - Walton finds
himself redoubled again as confessor to and judge of Victor, not only
listening to his story but obsessively recording, transcribing,
documenting it. Unable to fulfil either role, unable either to absolve
or to judge, Walton is finally thrown into the ironic suspense of
indecision as, refusing to reflect any further upon events, he simply
stops writing. But the paradigm for all of these textual confusions,
the single relationship in which each element threatens to absorb itself
into the other in a vertigo of indifference, is clearly that of Victor and
the creature. This point has become such a commonplace of
Frankenstein criticism that it is perhaps only necessary to indicate
the more obvious features of this tangle of roles and identities. There
is, for example, the model of the unhappy family played out between
the pair of them, Victor becoming 'mother' to a creature who responds
to him as to a scornful father - principally, of course, because artifice,
in the form of Paradise Lost, has played a determining role even in
the creature's world.22 Similarly, while Victor defiantly refuses to
admit a kinship with or even species·similarity to the creature, he also
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considers him 'nearly in the light of my own vampire, my own spirit
let loose from the grave and forced to destroy all that was dear to me'
(p.339). This confusion - which begins with the question of whom
'The New Prometheus' refers to, as it can legitimately apply to either
- reaches an entirely appropriate climax in their final crazy race to
the Pole, the creature pursuing Victor by running before him, the
fugitive insanely pursuing the hunter. 'I never saw a more interesting
creature', writes Walton in his first observation of Victor (p.28\), and
that just about says it all.
Victor's fiction of difference, of selflessness, of guiltlessness, is not
a misinterpretation of events, nor is it a misreading of his transcribed
tale. It is instead an effort to arrive at a certain sense of reality -
an effort undertaken by all of the central characters in this text. That
anxiety over documentation to which 1 referred earlier represents a
similar effort to 'fix' the world, as one would 'fix' a photograph -
to stop it from blurring further, to paralyse it into a moment of
significance, to make it mean what one would have it mean. But in
this context documentation tends rather to proliferate the problem -
it brings about a kind of fictive haemhorraging from one layer of the
text to the next, a contamination of the exterior tale by the interior,
exemplified in the passage of those lost letters from the heart of the
story within the story of the creature, those letters that lodge
themselves as crucial elements within each subsequent telling, letters
that appear as if they could substantiate the worlds of the text, but
then fail to appear at all, the only documents lost in the passage from
the Pole to England.23 This giddy movement between layers of the
text is in fact taken up in the structure of the narrative, which, although
frequently described as an arrangement of three concentric circles,
would be more accurately pictured as a spiral, since each 'circle' -
each distinct 'story': the creature's, Victor's, Walton's - inevitably leaks
into and implicates itself in the next. As it spirals inward the text
describes a process of absorption, but here one is absorbed not into
the truth of the tale - Which, by an ancient logic of narrative
disclosure, is always situated at the centre, the place of meaning -
but absorbed rather by an essential fictionality, for that centre here
is the product of artifice: the creature and his confession. Yet the
effective movement of this text is outward, describing a structure of
contagion: as it spirals outward the text traces the progress of a
dangerous infection in which, in a vicious parody of Romantic
aesthetics run amuk, artifice sets upon and begins slowly to displace
(to murder) the real. This contamination of an outer reality by an
interior unreality was always potentially there in the abstract structure
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itself, for that is the effect of frame-tale constructions where the frame,
although apparently in the authoritative position because it
comprehends everything else, is in fact radically subverted because it
is drawn into the play of perspective and becomes merely one more
layer in a potentially endless sequence. Given the general Gothic
interest in the destabilizing of authoritative perspectives, its interest
in the radical provisionality of - indeed the insubstantiality of -
points of view, it is not surprising that it was to indulge in ever more
extreme convolutions of the frame-tale device (indeed Frankenstein
is a relatively conservative example when compared to the vertiginous
experimentation of Melmoth the Wanderer). And that is why nothing
is ever 'fixed' - and nothing can be 'fixed' - in this story: a radical
provisionality, a failure of authority, a suspicion of artifice infects the
whole, destabilizing it, rendering everything terrifyingly uncertain.
Just as this text insinuates itself into and problematizes the
eighteenth-century realist tradition, so too does the creature insinuate
into the world of the text the problematic principle of artifice. The
very existence of the creature poses the question: at what point does
the artificial become the real? Or at what point does the real cease
being artificial? Every element of the text bears upon this central
question, which appears to become increasingly more difficult to
answer.
Read in this way it becomes tempting to play the Gothic game with
Frankenstein one more time - to discover in its epistemological
uncertainties, its mimetic hesitations, its textual instabilities, the record
of some historic fatality which the text psychotically re-enacts, to
apprehend it as, and to accommodate it within the wilfulness of
contemporary critical discourse as, the symptomatic delirium of its
age: the waning of divine authority, or the secularization of knowledge,
or the ethical anguish of that rational time struggling in blood to be
reasonable. Perhaps there is a case to be made - but I for one would
not want to say with any certainty that that is what Frankenstein is
about, that that is its allegory of the real, for the simple reason that
Frankenstein is a text which actively contests the principle of certainty
itself. Any reading of the text will always be ironically qualified in
advance by this single fact (the only one it gives us): that at the heart
of the text - symbolically, structurally, conceptually, and indeed
literally - there is an uncertain troubling of the real by artifice. Which
is why this remains a text that can be taken up again and again, always
meeting us halfway, teetering on the brink of meaning, inviting us
to play that Gothic game again of making something of it and, by
so doing, reveal once more our pathological interest in ourselves.
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It is worth noting. incidentally, that if we take the Gothic as commencing with
Walpole's The Castle ofOtranto. then this dialectic of plausibility-implausibility
is in evidence from the very beginning in Walpole's 'Preface' to the first edition.
where he writes:
I will detain the reader no longer but to make one short remark. Though the
machinery is invention, and the names of the actors imaginary, I cannot but believe
that the groundwork of the story is founded in truth. The scene is undoubtedly
laid in some real castle. The author seems frequently. without design, to describe
particular parts. The chamber: says he, on the right hand: the door on the left
hand: the distancefrom the chapel to Conrad's apartment: these and other passages
are strong presumptions that the author had some certain building in his eye.
Curious persons, who have leisure to employ in such researches, may possibly
discover in the Italian writers the foundation on which our auhor has built. If
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a catastrophe, at all resembling that which he described, is believed to have given
rise to this work, it will contribute to interest the reader, and will make The Castle
of Otranto a still more moving story. (Praz, op. cit., pp.4I-42)
21 No doubt it is the following passage that most impresses Victor in his reading:
'If the monster executed his threat, death was inevitable; yet, again, I considered
whether my marriage would hasten my fate. My destruction might indeed arrive
a few months sooner, but if my torturer should suspect that 1 postponed it,
influenced by his menaces, he would surely find other and perhaps more dreadful
means of revenge. He had vowed to be with me on my wedding night, yet he did
not consider that threat as binding him to peace in the mean time, for as if to
show me that he was not yet satiated with blood, he had murdered Clerval
immediately after the enunciation of his threats. I resolved, therefore, that if my
immediate union with my cousin would conduce either to hers or my father's
happiness, my adversary's designs against my life should not retard it a single hour.'
(p.460).
22 I\s I read; the creature informs Victor, '1 applied much personally to my own feelings
and condition' (p.395). Unable to calculate his own share in it, the creature is
naturally unable to distinguish the artifical from the real, and thus absorbs the
literary as the actual:
'But Paradise Lost excited different and far deeper emotions. I read it, as I had
read the other volumes which had fallen into my hands, as a true history. It moved
every feeling of wonder and awe that the picture of an omnipotent God warring
with his creatures was capable of exciting. I often referred the several situations,
as their similarity struck me, to my own. Like Adam, 1was apparently united by
no link to any other being in existence; but his state was far different from mine
in every other respect. He had come forth from the hands of God a perfect creature,
happy and prosperous, guarded by the especial care of his Creator; he was allowed
to converse with and acquire knowledge from beings of a superior nature, but
1was wretched, helpless, and alone. Many times I considered Satan as the fitter
emblem of my condition, for often, like him, when I viewed the bliss of my
protectors, the bitter gall of envy rose within me.' (p.396)
23 'I have copies of these letters; the creature tells Victor when first we hear of these
particular documents, 'for I found means, during my residence in the hovel, to
procure the implements of writing; and the letters were often in the hands or Felix
or Agatha. Before 1depart 1 will give them to you; they will prove the truth of
my tale; but at present, as the sun is already far declined, 1shall only have time
to repeat the substance of them to you.' (p.389).
So the creature virtually teaches himself to write in order to join in the general
obsession with transcription and certification; but as these letters never arrive (and
as that final play on 'substance' suggests) reference to them simply contributes
to the increasing sense of insubstantiality in this text.
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